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DISCRETIONARY DOCKETS 
Randy J. Kozel and Jeffrey A. Pojanowski* 
Fifty-five years ago~ Professor Henry Hart examined "'the 
volume of the [Supreme] Court's business and ... the ways in 
which the business is done." 1 After estimating how much time the 
Justices had available to deliberate and draft opinions in a given 
Term~ Hart concluded that the Court was resolving far too many 
cases by full opinion.2 He also drew a connection between the 
Court~s overstuffed docket and the quality of its work. For Hart~ 
the absence of time necessary for "the maturing of collective 
thought" ensured that few of the Court's opinions could 
"'genuinely illumine the area of law" in question; others failed 
·'even by much more elementary standards.~~~ Reasoned and 
principled elaboration of the law~ Hart contended, takes more 
time than the Supreme Court was able to give. 
Judging by the numbers, one might think Professor Hart 
would be happier today. Hart assumed an average of 117 opinions 
of the Court each Term.4 During October Term 2014, the Court 
issued only 74 such opinions, of which eight were summary 
reversals.5 That performance was almost identical to the Court~s 
October 2013 Term, which yielded 73 opinions, including six 
* Professors of Law, Notre Dame Law School. For helpful questions ami 
comments, the authors thank Amy Barrett, Will Baudc, A.J. Bcllia, Barry Cushman, Erin 
Delancy, Orin Kerr, James Lindgren, John McGinnis, Mark McKenna, Andrea Pin, 
Richard Rc, Amanda Tyler, Rachacl Walsh, Mark Walters, and Paul Yowell. They arc 
also gratdul for the opportunity to present the paper <lt the Notre Dame Program on 
Constitutional Structure's roundtahlc in London, England on "The Common Law in an 
Age of Regulation," as well as the Federalist Society's 2016 Faculty Conference. 
I. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court-Foreword: The Time Chart of the 
.Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. X4, X4 ( 1959). 
2. !d. at 99. 
3. /d. at 100. 
4. /d. at90-91. 
5. Final Stat Packj(Jr Octoher Term 2014, SCCHUSHLOG (June 30, 201), 11:23 AM), 
http://www.se<Jtushlog.com/20 I S/06/final-stat-pack -for-octohcr-tcrm-2014/. Two cases 
were dismissed at'lcr <lrgumcnt. /d. 
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summary reversals.6 These numbers are typical of a Court that 
now rarely decides more than RO cases in a Term. 7 1\nd the Court's 
docket shows no signs of expanding. If anything, the Justices are 
becoming more cautious in selecting cases for review. Recent 
years have witnessed the emergence of an informal ''cooling off'' 
period between the Court's initial discussion of a case and its 
order granting certiorari.x Assuming that this certiorari two-step 
holds, we can expect even more petitions to be rejected as "fact-
bound" or beset by "vehicle problems," two phrases that the 
Justices' law clerks customarily invoke. 
In theory, the Court's slim docket should allow it to leverage 
the luxury of time to enhance the clarity of its pronouncements 
and rationales. By crafting broad and comprehensive opinions, 
the Court could counterbalance the infrequency of its 
interventions. Such a Rulemaking Court would ''illumine the law" 
through the reasoned elaboration Hart thought incumbent upon 
the nation's highest tribunal.l) Likewise, maintaining a smaller 
docket gives the Court more time to ensure that the choices 
undergirding its rules are grounded in sound empirical, 
normative, and historical j udgments. 10 While the Court's 
contributions may be relatively few and far between, they could 
be wide-ranging and deeply reasoned. 
The corollary is that if the Supreme Court's docket were 
markedly larger- as it was for much of the twentieth century- its 
ability to function effectively as a rulemaker would suffer, as 
Professor Hart suggested. The natural mode of decisionmaking 
for a Court that confronts an onerous docket is not wide-ranging 
6. Final Stat Packf(Jr Octoher Term 2013 and Key Takeaways, SCOTUSBLOG (July 
3, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.scotushlog.com/2014/06/final-stat -pack -for-octoher-term-
2013-and-key-takeaways-2/. As in October Term 2014, two cases were dismissed after 
argument. /d. 
7. See J::enerally Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Exp!aininJ:: the Supreme Court's 
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012). 
H. See John Elwood, Relist Watch: What Does the Court's Relist Streak Mean'!, 
ScurusBLOG (Apr. 23,2014, II :SO AM), http://www.scotushlog.com/2014/04/rclist-watch-
what -does-the-cou rts-relist -streak- mean/. 
9. See Hart, supra note I, at 100. 
10. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIPYING LEGAL 
REASONING 25-26 (200H) (arguing that courts either "reason deductively from rules 
posited hy others; or they posit law, relying on moral and empirical judgment, as any 
lawmaker must"). 
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rulemaking, but fact-specific adjudication. 11 To be sure, an 
Adjudicating Court is aware that its pronouncements will affect 
subsequent cases by informing the rule of decision that future 
judges deduce and apply. 1:z Yet the Adjudicating Court does not 
try to set out broad rules to govern situations beyond the case 
before it. Rather, such a Court makes its impression over time by 
resolving a string of disputes, each of which represents a marginal 
and incremental contribution to the development of the law. 
We can compare the Rulemaking Court and Adjudicating 
Court with the Reluctant Court, which decides few cases and does 
so narrowly. The same impulses-such as a restrained vision of 
the judicial role or a deferential posture toward the political 
branches- that drive a court to limit its docket may also lead it to 
be guarded and tentative in the decisions it renders. Even so, from 
a guidance perspective the Reluctant Court does precious little. It 
calls to mind Professor Hart's lament about questions being 
"ducked which in good lawyership and good conscience ought not 
to be ducked" and opinions that "fail to build the bridge between 
the authorities they cite and the results they decree." 13 
There is one other option for how case selection can interact 
with decisionmaking mode. An Experimental Court resolves 
numerous cases and does so with comprehensive, wide-ranging 
rules. Notwithstanding its impressive ambition, the Experimental 
Court raises in fullest form the central concern noted by Professor 
Hart: a court that does too much might not do anything well. 
In practice, the lines between these decisionmaking modes 
are often blurred. That, we submit, is all the more reason to pay 
attention to them. Whether the Supreme Court is understood as 
a unified institution or a collection of individual actors (or both), 14 
its willingness to shift between decisionmaking modes raises 
important questions about its role- and its own conception of 
that role-in the constitutional order. These questions are salient 
II. q: SEC v. Chcncry Corp., 332 U.S. 1lJ4, 201-07 ( llJ47) (discussing an 
administrative agency's choice to develop law through rulcmaking or adjudication). 
12. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW o 
( llJlJl) (''[T]hc judicial establishment of legal rules would occur even if the sole function of 
the courts was to resolve disputes."). 
13. Hart, supra note L at 100-01 (quoting Alexander Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, 
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Uncoln Mills Case. 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1lJ57)). 
14. Sec. e.g., Adrian Ycrmculc, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive 
Theory and the Fallacy of Division. 14 J. CONTFMP. L. ISSUI S 54lJ (2005). 
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as the Court moves forward from a 2014 Term marked by 
contentious debates over the judiciary's place in the political and 
sociallandscape, 15 followed by a 2015 Term in which the death of 
Justice Anton in Scalia forced the Court to examine how to fufill 
its role with only eight members. It is a good time to step back and 
consider more broadly the different modes of decisionmaking and 
their interaction with the Court's principles for deciding when and 
where to intervene. 
It is common knowledge that the Supreme Court's docket is 
almost entirely discretionary. That means the Justices decide for 
themselves which cases to review and which to let pass. What we 
wish to emphasize is that while the Court's docket is indeed 
discretionary, its strategy in selecting cases should affect how it 
crafts its opinions- at least if the provision of guidance is among 
the Court's core objectives. Case-selection may be discretionary 
and still create important obligations for the way in which judges 
go about their work. Or so we claim. 
This Essay examines the dynamics of the Rulemaking Court, 
the Adjudicating Court, the Reluctant Court, and the 
Experimental Court. We highlight the relationship between a 
court's mode of decisionmaking, docket management, and sense 
of institutional role. Our focus is the Supreme Court's treatment 
of constitutional law, whose derivation and evolution provides a 
rich topic of study. Whether the Supreme Court operates with a 
large docket or a small one, it can decide cases in a manner that 
crystallizes legal norms and provides guidance to the legal 
community and society at large. Yet for the Court to serve these 
functions effectively, its mode of decisionmaking n1ust align with 
its strategy in filling (or not) its docket. 
We suggest that in seeking to furnish guidance and enhance 
clarity, a supreme court that resolves a small number of cases is 
well served to decide those cases in relatively broad terms 
supported by relatively deep reasoning. By comparison, a court 
that decides a greater number of cases will have more 
opportunities to clarify the law through incremental 
interventions. (}eneral rules can emerge over time through the 
15. See Adam Liptak, Justices' Opinions Grow in Size, Accessif,ifity, and Testiness, 
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2015, at A 17. The most ohvious example is Ohergdell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 25X4 (2015). Others include Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2t152 (2015); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2721) (2015); and 
Williams- Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
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repeated application of law to fact. This gradual evolution is 
important, because a court that is busy with an onerous docket 
will have less time to devote to any single case. We also examine 
the Reluctant and Experimental approaches to constitutional law, 
which we conclude are ill-suited to the provision of sound 
guidance. They become attractive only if a court understands 
itself as primarily concerned with something other than the 
development and crystallization of legal principles. 
I. LEGAL GUIDANCE AND DECISIONMAKING STYLE 
The lJ .S. Supreme Court contributes to the development of 
constitutional law by offering reasoned results. The Court issues 
not merely decisions, but opinions. This point may seem almost 
too banal to mention, but it turns out to be crucial to the structure 
of American constitutional law, for it connects the Supreme Court 
to the common law tradition. 
Here we are adopting a more capacious definition of 
common law judging than is sometimes employed. Owing to the 
thoughtful work of scholars such as David Strauss, common law 
constitutionalism is often depicted as standing in tension with 
text-centric methodologies such as originalism. 16 To some, that 
tension might suggest that one can be faithful to the common law 
tradition or to the Constitution's enacted text, but not to both. 
And, indeed, there are ways in which particular versions of 
originalism and common law constitutionalism find themselves in 
conflict. But in general, there is no contradiction in the view that 
original meanings and judicial precedents both have a significant 
role to play in shaping the trajectory of constitutional law. For 
example, one might conclude that the development of 
constitutional law can and should proceed through the accretion 
of judicial decisions even while recognizing value in adhering to 
the Constitution's text. 17 Or one might give primacy to the 
Constitution's original meaning while falling back on judicial 
precedent when the original meaning is too uncertain to resolve a 
16. See, e.g, David A. Strauss. Common J"aw Constitutional Imerprelalion. 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. '8.77, X7Y ( 1YY6) (juxtaposing originalism and common law constitutionalism). 
17. cr id. at 1)06-16 (discussing the role of constitutional text within common law 
constitutionalism). 
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particular question. 1x This overlap is reinforced by the fact that 
the common law tradition encompasses fidelity to judicial 
precedents and enacted texts just as it does fidelity to other 
sources of legal meaning. 19 
The relationship between text, precedent, and the common 
law method also bears on recent debates over constitutional 
"construction." Some commentators contend that when the 
Constitution's text is underdeterminate- when efforts at 
semantic "interpretation" leave multiple options on the table-
judges must rely on normative commitments to assist in 
"constructing'' constitutional law.20 There are a variety of 
intriguing dimensions to constitutional construction, and there are 
important challenges to the legitimacy of construction as a judicial 
enterprise. 21 For present purposes, we take no sides on the 
interpretation/construction debates, and we surely take no sides 
on larger questions such as the validity of originalism as an 
interpretive methodology. We simply note that whether it is 
labeled as common law constitutionalism or constitutional 
construction or something else, much of what the Supreme Court 
does is consistent with the idea of developing constitutional rules 
through the creation, crystallization, and reconsideration of 
doctrine over time. As a descriptive matter, "our written 
constitution has ... become part of an evolutionary common law 
system."22 But evolution need not entail marginalizing 
constitutional text or original meanings. The validity of 
constitutional development through precedents and doctrines 
does not depend on one's allegiance to original ism, living 
constitutionalism, or any other interpretive methodology. There 
are myriad ways for judges-even judges whose primary 
allegiance is to text and history- to interpret the Constitution in 
a manner that bears hallmarks of the common law method. 
I X. See Randy J. Koz<-:1, OriRinal MeaninR and the Precedent Fall hack, 6X V AND. L. 
REv. 105, lOX (2015) (dd<.:nding a suhstantial role for judicial pn~ccd<.:nt "when th<.: 
Constitution's original m<.:aning cannot confidently he disc<.:rncd"). 
19. q: Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common iAlW Tradition, 101 
Y A. L. REV. 1357 (2015) (cxt<.:nding this argument to th<.: context of statutory 
interpretation). 
20. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMM. Y5, 104-06 (2010). 
21. See, e.g, John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good 
Constitution 141 (2013). 
22. Strauss, supra note 16, at XK5. 
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To be sure~ the practice of constitutional interpretation does 
not share every feature with classical conceptions of the con1mon 
law. Most importantly~ where constitutional text is clear, it is not 
subject to judicial override in the same way that judicial 
precedents are.23 Nevertheless~ through its use of caselaw to flesh 
out legal norms and rules~ American constitutional practice stands 
as a "central case of common law methodology.~'24 
For present purposes~ the key question is how the Supreme 
Court should exercise its common law mandate within the 
constitutional context. Fashioning an answer requires an 
accommodation of past and future: a respect for precedents that 
have come before combined with awareness of the path of 
constitutional law going forward. 
The relationship between fidelity to the past and 
responsibility for the future is a central theme in the story of the 
common law. As early as 1601~ the English scholar-lawyer John 
Selden identified the common law with the Roman god Janus~ 
whose two faces look both to yesterday and tomorrow. 25 The 
starting point for a court-including a constitutional court-
operating in the common law tradition is where the law has been.26 
But after engaging with the past~ the court confronts a choice 
regarding the future. It may act as an Adjudicating Court that 
concentrates on applying (and~ if necessary~ adapting) extant legal 
principles to the specific facts at hand. Or it may act as a 
Rulemaking Court by articulating a broadly applicable rule~ along 
with a comprehensive description of rationale~ to govern 
subsequent cases. Whichever approach it adopts~ the courfs 
23. q: Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 455 
(llJIN) ("IT]he lawmaking power of common law courts is more than interstitial, and 
extends to modifying or replacing what had previously heen thought to he the governing 
rule .... "). 
24. !d. at 470 n. 41. 
25. Sel' Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law .lurisprudencl' (Part /), 2 
OXFORD U. COMMONW. L.J. 155, 155 (2002) (citing Paul Christianson, Young John Selden 
and the Ancient Constitution, ca. 1610-/R, 12X PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. Soc'y 271,310 n. 
1lJ(llJX4)). 
26. See Strauss, supra note 16, at XlJ1-lJ2 (linking the common law with the idea that 
"one should he very careful ahout rejecting judgments made hy people who were acting 
rdlcctively and in good faith, especially when those judgments have hcen reaffirmed or at 
least accepted over time," hecause "l.i]udgments of this kind emhody not just serious 
thought hy one group of people, or even one generation, hut the accumulated wisdom of 
many generations"). 
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prerogative is to respect the past while shining light on the future 
through the issuance of practical guidance. 27 
In this Part and the next, we examine the Adjudicating and 
Rulemaking modes of decisionmaking, which take different paths 
toward the common goal of elucidating the meaning of 
constitutional law through judicial opinions. 
A. ADJUDICATING 
The Adjudicating Court draws "on the fund of accumulated 
experience recorded in the common law"2s and applies it with 
precision to the particular facts at hand. Faced with a challenging 
case, the Court "look[ s] longer, harder, and deeper" into its store 
of exemplars and, by analogy and rational extension, discerns a 
resolution from "within the law.''29 This approach, which has deep 
roots in classical common law jurisprudence, offers practical 
guidance through the steady accumulation and refinement of 
judicial reasoning.-10 The development of the law is deliberate in 
pace and incremental and organic in character. 
For an illustration of the Supreme Court operating in 
Adjudicating mode, consider its recent Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence originating with Crawford v. Washington. 31 Finding 
that the Clause's text does not specify what kind of out-of-court 
statements are admissible against a defendant in a criminal trial, 
the Court turned to the '"historical background."32 After an 
extensive survey of English and American common law history, 
the Court concluded that the Clause's requirements apply to 
27. See, e.g., ('Jerald J. Postema, Law's System: The Necessity of System in Common 
Law, 2014 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 69,93 (explaining that common law "reasoning is puhlic 
and practical, so it is meant to serve the purpose of normative guidance of official and lay 
decisions and actions in and for a public"). 
2X. Postema, supra note 25, at 177. 
29. !d. at 17X-7lJ. 
30. q: Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 
OxroRD U. COMMONW. L.J. 1, 4 (2003) (stating that common law jurists "not only had to 
solve the immediate problem at hand, but ... also had to set an example that could 
reasonably be followed in other cases"). For some, case-specific adjudication is the only 
approach that can reconcile the provision of forward-looking guidance with the traditional 
understanding of the judicial office. See, e.g, Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, 
Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, lJ4 
CORNELL L. REV. 5X7. 5lJ4 (200lJ) ("[T]he Federalist Founders ... evidently did not foresee 
the Supreme Court as a supcrlegislaturc. The judges they knew merely decided contested 
cases in the common law tradition familiar to them."). 
31. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
32. !d. at 42-43. 
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"testimonial" statements.33 Although the Court offered examples 
of the "core class" of those statements, it declined to articulate a 
canonical formulation, explaining that the statements at issue 
were clearly testimonial. 34 
Crawford thus expanded the reach of the Sixth Amendment 
while leaving unanswered numerous questions about the scope of 
the confrontation right. 35 The Justices disagreed over Crawford's 
fidelity to precedent,36 but there was no question that the opinion 
left much to be done going forward. The Court responded by 
returning to the Confrontation Clause on several occasions during 
the ensuing Terms, incrementally defining the contours of 
"testimonial" statements.37 By keeping the issue on its agenda, the 
Court counterbalanced the uncertainty that initially resulted from 
its refusal to set forth a canonical formulation in Crawford. In this 
respect, Crawford exemplified the Adjudicating mode even as it 
redescribed or revised (depending on one's perspective) the 
Court's former approach to the Confrontation Clause. Rather 
than announcing a new rule that was both general in scope and 
broadly determinative in guidance, Crawford left the elaboration 
of its approach for future cases.3x That choice imposed a corollary 
duty on the Court to continue developing its rule through 
subsequent applications-an obligation the Court discharged by 
repeatedly granting certiorari to resolve Confrontation Clause 
disputes. 
The Court's jurisprudence regarding the jury trial right has 
taken a similar path. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court 
identified in its decisional law a requirement that any fact-
:n. It/. at 51. 
34. /d. at 51-52. 
35. See id. at hY (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgmt:nl) ("]The majority's rule] 
casts a mantle of uncertainty ovt:r future criminal trials in both federal and state courts, 
and is by no means necessary to decide the present case."). 
36. Compare id. ("I dissent from the Court"s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roherts 
... . "),with id. at5X (majority opinion) (stating that "]e]ven our recent cases [like Roherts], 
in their outcomes hew closely to the traditional line" between testimonial and non-
testimonial statements). 
37. St>e, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (expert testimony on DNA 
profile is non-testimonial); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (blood-alcohol 
analysis report is testimonial); Mclendez-Diaz v. Massachust:lls, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) 
(laboratory amtlysis of cocaine is testimonial). 
31-\. See Larry Alexander, "With Me It's All er Nuthin '": Formalism in Law and 
Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 545 (1999) (arguing that "there is a tendency for 
generality and determinateness to go together" in rule-based decisionmaking). 
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besides the fact of a prior conviction- that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond a statutory maximum must be submitted to the 
jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.3l) The carve-out for 
prior convictions was itself a product of the common law method; 
that exception, though discordant as a conceptual matter, was 
well-rooted in the Courfs precedent.40 While recognizing that the 
exception was hard to square with its holding as a matter of logic, 
the Court was content to rule more narrowly, focusing on the case 
at hand rather than aiming to enhance doctrinal coherence more 
broadly. Thus, even as it ushered in an important development in 
its constitutional jurisprudence, the Court saw no need to set forth 
a capacious, internally consistent rule of the sort we might expect 
from a legislature. Nor did the Court try to explain the 
ramifications of its rationale for every relevant aspect of the 
criminal sentencing regime. Instead, it derived a pertinent 
principle and applied it to the situation at hand. 
The Apprendi Court left it to subsequent cases to define the 
contours of the jury trial right. Those cases have sometimes 
extended Apprendi to related issues and contexts.41 At other 
times, the Court has cabined Apprendi's sweep, as with the factual 
findings required for imposing consecutive-running sentences.42 
Through this sustained series of interventions, the Court has 
generated a body of decisions, distinctions, and analogies that 
exemplifies the Adjudicating mode. 
Beyond high-profile contexts like criminal sentencing and 
confrontation of witnesses, the Adjudicating mode also emerges 
in less momentous cases. Consider one of Chief Justice Roberts' 
earliest opinions, Jones v. Flowers. 43 There, the Court addressed a 
comparatively picayune question of first impression: what steps 
the Due Process Clause requires a state to take before selling a 
taxpayer's property when a notice of tax sale is returned in the 
mail as unclaimed. In ruling for the taxpayer, the Court focused 
on the particularities of the statutory regime and the specific 
dispute at hand. It identified '"several reasonable steps" the State 
3Y. See Apprcmli v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 4o6 (2000). 
40. See id. at 4K5-XY (discussing cases including Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
523 U.S. 224 (1YYX) and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 7Y (l()X6)). 
41. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 2% (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
5K4 (2002). 
42. See Oregon v. Icc, 555 U.S. 1 oO (200()). 
43. 547 U.S. 220 (2006 ). 
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could have taken under the circumstances, such as addressing the 
letter to "occupant" or posting a notice on the front door.44 For 
scholars of the Court who are accustomed to (or tired of) 
arguments of high principle, the Justices' discussion of whether 
the Arkansas tax commissioner must search the Little Rock 
phonebook for a new address-a discussion that was in service of 
a narrow, case-specific holding-is remarkably homely.45 
Disclaiming the notion that it was doing anything noteworthy, the 
Court explained that "under the circumstances'' of the case, 
existing due process principles required the state to take 
additional measures to give notice of an in1minent property sale. 46 
But while it can extend to mundane cases, the Adjudicating 
mode is most notable when it arises in high-profile constitutional 
disputes. Take the example of Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 
which presented major questions about the appointment and 
removal of officers in independent agencies.47 Some 
commentators saw the case as raising the specter (or the promise) 
of rendering independent agencies unconstitutional. 4s Yet this 
putative watershed yielded only a trickle of doctrinal 
development. Clinging closely to precedent, the Court rejected an 
Appointments Clause challenge to the relevant agency board.4l) 
And though the majority offered some sweeping rhetoric about 
the importance of presidential control of executive officers, its 
constitutional holding was confined to officers insulated by two 
layers of removal restrictions.50 While the dissent criticized the 
majority for the destabilizing implications of its ruling, the 
majority downplayed those worries and was content to leave 
remaining questions for another day. 51 The narrow holding of 
44. /d. at 234-35. 
45. /d. at 235-36. For tht.: rt.:cord, tht.: cornmissionn dot.:s not havt.: to. 
46. /d. at 225. 
47. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
4X. See. e.g, Pt.:LL:r L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization- PCAOB in the 
Footsteps ofMyt.:rs, Humphrt.:y's Ext.:cutor, Morrison, and Frt.:ytag, 32 CARDOZO. L. REV. 
2255, 2275 (2011) ("[ Challcngt.:rs [ hopt.:d that tht.: Court would reach hack to undo tht.: 
rnischid tht.:y hdit.:vt.: had ht.:t.:n dont.: to that vit.:w wht.:n in Humphrey's Executor a 
unanimous Court pt.:rmittt.:d Congrt.:ss to t.:stahlish agt.:ncks whost.: ht.:ads could ht.: rt.:movt.:d 
only 'for caust.:.'"). 
41}. See Fret' Enraprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 510 ("PL:titiont.:rs raise thret.: mort.: 
chalkngcs to tht.: Board undn tht.: Appointmt.:nts Claust.:. Nont.: has mnit.'"). 
50. /d. at 495-97. 
51. See id. at 514 (Brt.:yn, J., disst.:nting) (claiming that the Court's "holding 
thrt.:att.:ns to disrupt sevt.:rdy tht.: fair and dficient administration of the law:-"); id. at 506 
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unconstitutionality offered challengers not the broad victory they 
sought, but only doctrinal and rhetorical fodder for the next day's 
fight. 52 This approach captures the sensibility of the Adjudicating 
Court: the province of the Court is to resolve disputes, so once the 
outcome of a dispute is clear, the Court has no furtlher business to 
transact. 
B. RULEMAKING 
The Supreme Court sometimes operates squarely in the 
mode of Rulemaker. It announces wide-ranging rules that are 
manifestly designed to guide the resolution of future disputes not 
presently before it.53 
A classic example is New York Times v. Sullivan.54 Sullivan 
provided the Court with an opportunity to articulate broad rules 
for the handling of defamation cases against public officials, and 
the Court did not disappoint-it offered a "federal rule" that 
requires a showing of actual malice in suits relating to a plaintiff's 
official conduct.55 The application of law to the facts at hand 
almost seemed an afterthought. Indeed, the Court came close to 
apologizing for its engagement with the facts before it, explaining 
that its "duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional 
principles," but rather must sometimes extend to "review[ing] the 
evidence to make certain that those principles have been 
constitutionally applied. "56 Implicit in the Court's explanation is 
an understanding of its role as Rulemaker first and Adjudicator 
second (if at all). And the Court's sentiments have proved 
prophetic; while Sullivan's underlying facts are important legally 
(majority opinion) (avoiding "general pronouncements on matters neither hricfed nor 
argued here" and responding that "the dissent fails to support its premonitions of doom"). 
52. Sec Richard H. Pildcs, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, 
and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & POL'Y 1, l) (2010). 
53. Hart himself seemed to cmhrace this understanding, or at least to reject the 
alternative. See Hart, supra note L at l)l) (deeming inadequate the notion that the Court is 
''engaged primarily in a technical lawyer's joh, applying and distinguishing precedents with 
relatively little freedom for the play of creative thought"). 
54. 376 U.S. 254 ( 1964 ). 
55. !d. at 279-XO ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule 
that prohihits a puhlic official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood 
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual 
malice."'). 
56. ld. at 2X5. 
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and historically, the case is famous for the general test the Court 
articulated. 
Another prominent illustration of the Rulemaking Court in 
action is Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court announced 
detailed warnings to safeguard the privilege against self-
incrimination.57 Miranda could have been decided on far narrower 
grounds; as Judge Easterbrook has observed, Ernesto Miranda 
"had not been given any warning," meaning the Court surely did 
not need to articulate multiple warnings that must be furnished 
going forward.5x Yet the Court used the case as an opportunity to 
reshape interactions between police officers and criminal 
suspects. It became, unequivocally and unabashedly, a 
Rulemaking Court, announcing "in unqualified terms not only 
what the rule of law now was, but also exactly what frontline 
agents such as police officers needed to do in order to comply with 
it."59 
Roe v. Wade reflects a similar mentality.60 Roe recognized a 
constitutional right to nontherapeutic abortions under certain 
circumstances, but it also went further by announcing a trimester 
framework to guide the treatment of abortion cases in future 
years. Again, the Supreme Court assumed the mantle of 
Rulemaker. That fact was made all the starker by the Court's 
subsequent decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which 
preserved Roe's central holding but replaced the trimester 
framework with an "undue burden" test that is more receptive to 
incremental, fact-specific decisionmaking.61 
A more recent illustration of the Rulemaking Court comes 
from United States v. Stevens. 62 Stevens dealt with legislation 
aimed at depictions of extreme violence against animals. Among 
the arguments presented by the government was that such 
57. 3X4 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("IUinlcss other fully effective means arc devised to 
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it, the following measures arc required. Prior to any questioning, the person must 
he warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he docs make may he 
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed."). 
5X. See Fahccm-EI v. Klincar, X41 F.2d 712, 730 (7th Cir. 1lJXX) (en hanc) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
5lJ. Frederick Schauer, AhandoninK the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207. 
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1lJ73). 
61. 505 U.S. X33, X74 (1lJlJ2) (plurality opinion). 
62. 55l) u.s. 460 (2010). 
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depictions are proscribable because "the bannedl depictions of 
animal cruelty, as a class, are categorically unprotected by the 
First Amendment. "63 According to the government, First 
Amendment protection yields when a category of speech has 
societal costs that significantly outweigh its benefits.6·~ 
The Stevens Court rejected this submission, dismissing it as 
"startling and dangerous."65 But the Court did not confine its 
staternents to depictions of animal cruelty. Instead, the Court 
shifted into Rulemaking mode by announcing a test to govern 
future First Amendment disputes: categories of speech are 
beyond the First Amendmenfs protection only when there is a 
"long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation."66 
To be sure, the Court asserted that its rule had a historical 
antecedent.67 Still, it is difficult to view Stevens as merely 
identifying a trend that had emerged over time or converting a 
partially-defined standard into a clear rule. 6~ Prior to Stevens, the 
caselaw indicated a different approach-one grounded in cost-
benefit analysis rather than historical excavation- for recognizing 
categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. The effect 
of Stevens was to discard that inquiry and establish a new rule 
going forward. 6 '> 
The practical import of Stevens has also been determined for 
many future disputes. While the Court left open the possibility 
that it might recognize additional, historically-rooted exceptions 
to protection in future cases,70 the number of such exceptions 
seems likely to be low. If that prediction is accurate, then Stevens 
did not simply announce a rule relating to the depiction of cruelty 
63. /d. at 46X. 
M. St'e id. at 469-70. 
65. !d. at 470. 
66. /d. at 46l). 
67. See id. at 471 ("When we hC:lvc identified CC:ltcgorics of speech as fully outside the 
protection of the First Amendment, it has not hccn on the hasis of C:l simple cost-hcndit 
analysis .... "). 
6X. C( Mark Tushnct, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 103, 124 (2012) ("There is a long-standing scholarly tradition C:lrguing that, as 
cases accumulate, courts arc driven to move from standards to rules. Experience 
accumulates, and judges get familiar with some generic features of situations they 
repeatedly confront."). 
69. St'e id. at 113. 
70. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472 (''MC:lyhc there arc some categories of speech that 
have hccn historically unprotected, hut have not yet heen specifically identified or 
discussed as such in our case law."). 
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to animals. It sharply limited an entire modality of constitutional 
argument as applied to the freedom of speech. What began as a 
dispute about videos featuring ani1nal cruelty ended up as an 
inflection point for First Amendment jurisprudence. An 
Adjudicating Court could never countenance such a result; there 
is no clearer counterpoint to case-by-case determinations than 
sweeping rules that range far beyond the facts at hand. In 
Stevens-as in Sullivan, Miranda, and Roe-the Rulemaking 
Court was at work. 71 
C. PRECEDENT 
The distinction between the Adjudicating and Rulemaking 
modes has implications for a court's relationship with precedent. 
An Adjudicating Court moves away from disfavored precedents 
through a series of incremental steps. Barry Friedman contends 
that the Supreme Court has used this technique- albeit in a way 
he criticizes for its "stealth"- to distance itself from the Miranda 
decision.72 Likewise, David Strauss depicts the evolution of First 
Amendment doctrine during the twentieth century as incremental 
and halting; he argues that "the key principles were developed 
71. The distinction between Adjudicating and Rulemaking bears some similarities 
to Professor Eisenberg's useful distinction between a "by-product model" of 
dccisionmaking, in which "courts establish legal rules only as an incidental by-product of 
resolving disputes," and an "enrichment model" of decisionmaking, in which "the 
establishment of legal rules to govern social conduct is treated as desirable in itself ... so 
that the courts consciously take on the function of developing certain bodies of law, albeit 
on a case-by-case basis." EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 6. For present purposes, we prefer 
the concepts of Adjudicating and Rulemaking for two reasons. First, those concepts 
highlight the role of the deciding court as an institution, which is this Essay'~ focal point. 
And second, the concepts help to emphasize that Adjudicating and Rulemaking can both 
serve, in design as well as effect, as mechanisms for enriching the field of constitutional 
law. 
72. See Barry Friedman, The Wa,(,'es of Stealth OverrulinK (With Particular Attention 
to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16 (2010). This is not the only technique that 
Professor Friedman describes the Court as having utilized: while some of its "cases ate 
away at Miranda's rationale like termites at the foundation of a house, leaving the 
precedent ostensibly standing but precarious to the point of being uninhabitable," others 
"simply hacked off chunks of Miranda or the cases initially implementing it."). /d. For a 
diffL:rcnt perspective, sec Richard M. Rc, Narrowin,(,' Prt'cedcnt in the Supreme Court, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 1X61, 1X65-66 (2014) (""ISitcalth overruling' is actually neither stealth 
nor overruling but just a pejorative term for an undcrappreciatcd mainstay of modern 
Supreme Court practice. And, like other powerful techniques, narrowing can he legitimate 
or not, depending on the situation.'') (footnote omitted). 
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over fifty years, often through trial and error, w:lth many false 
starts and subsequent corrections.''73 
At other tin1es, the Court is willing to replace an old rule with 
a new one in fairly short order. Consider Citizens United v. FEC/4 
a case that has been the source of extensive debate7' Citizens 
United expressly overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce/0 which had taken a restrictive view of the rights of 
corporations and labor unions to promote or oppose political 
candidates. 77 In theory, the Citizens United Court might have 
avoided Austin rather than overruling it. Among the arguments 
before the Court was that the relevant statute did not cover the 
particular speech at issue,7x that the unique manner of distributing 
the speech-namely, through an on-demand video service-
diminished the government's interests in proscribing it,7Y and that 
there should be special constitutional rules "for nonprofit 
corporate political speech funded overwhelmingly by 
individuals. "xo Justice Stevens drew on these possibilities in 
contending that "'there were principled, narrower paths that a 
Court that was serious about judicial restraint could have 
taken."x 1 For the majority, however, the "narrower paths" were 
illusory, as they would have led to the incorrect result. As Chief 
Justice Roberts explained in his concurrence, "we cannot 
embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow; 
it must also be right. "x2 
73. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 62 (2010); see also id. at 76 ("It 
developed over time, fitfully, by a process in which principles and standards were tried and 
sometimes eventually accepted, sometimes abandoned, sometimes modified, in light of 
experience and an ongoing, explicit assessment of whether they were sound as a matter of 
policy."). 
74. 55~ U.S. 310 (2010). 
75. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 72, at 39 ("The President cri;licizcd it. It became 
the focus of controversy at the State of the Union address .... Polls showed overwhelming 
dissatisfaction on both sides of the ideological line, and Congress considered action in 
response.") (footnotes omitted). 
76. 4lJ4 U.S. 652 (llJ90). 
77. Citizens United, 55~ U.S. at 3()5 (overruling Austin and embracing the principle, 
which the majority described as established by other precedents, that "the Government 
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity"). 
7~. See id. at 322-23. 
79. See id. at 326. 
XO. /d. at 327. 
~1. /d. at 40X (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
X2. !d. at 375 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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Of course, Austin was up for grabs because the Court had put 
it up for grabs. It was at the Court's own urging that the parties 
briefed the question whether Austin should be overruled.x3 A 
majority of Justices saw the need for a new rule, and they showed 
no hesitation in announcing it. Citizens United thus reflects a 
sweeping displacement of precedent by a Rulemaking Court. 
That said, the Citizens United opinion is not necessarily 
incompatible with the common law tradition. The replacement of 
old rules with new ones is a familiar feature of common law 
judging.x4 What is more, the Court frequently describes its new 
rules as informed and inspired by backward-looking analysis- by 
the consultation of precedents, history, and tradition. A 
Rulemaking Court accordingly may evince the same attention to 
the past as an Adjudicating Court. 
Indeed, Citizens United itself is notable for the majority's 
emphasis on precedent and its contention that Austin was 
vulnerable based in part on its incompatibility with other 
precedents. xs In terms of decision making n1ode, the defining 
feature of Citizens United is not that the Court ignored what had 
gone before. It is that, when it came time to look to the future, the 
Court was unwilling to confine itself to a narrow, case-specific 
resolution. Whatever might be said of Citizens United on the 
merits, its central lesson- "the Government may not suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate 
identity"xh_came through loud and clear. The Court willingly 
assumed the role of Rulemaker. 
11. DOCKET CONTROL 
Having sketched the Adjudicating and Rulemaking modes of 
decisionmaking, we turn to their effects, assumptions, and 
X3. See it!. at 396 (Stevens, J ., concurring in part ami dissenting in part) ("!T!hc 
majority decides this case on a hasis relinquished hclow, not included in the questions 
presented to us hy the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court's 
invitation."). 
X4. Cf Strauss, supra note 16, at 909 ("In fact, rules, as well as casc-hy-case decision 
making, arc an important part of the common law."). 
X5. See Citizens United, 55X U.S. at 34X (majority opinion) ("The Court is thus 
confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forhids restrictions on 
political speech hascd on the speaker's corporate identity and a post-Austin line that 
permits them."); it!. at 363 (arguing that "Austin ... itself contravened this Court's earlier 
precedents in Buckley and Bellotti"). 
X6. !d. at 365. 
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consequences for the way in which the Supreme Court goes about 
its business. With respect to both types of courts, we shall 
emphasize the importance of settlement and guidance. The 
common lawyers were not motivated solely by "traditionalist" 
considerations such as humility and restraint.~n They also 
"insisted, plausibly in at least some cases, that it was important to 
have certain matters settled because the costs of further 
controversy were too great. "xx Matthew Hale described "'the end 
that Men might understand by what rule and measure to live & 
possess" as "the prime reason ... that the wiser Sort of the world 
have in all ages agreed upon Some certain[] laws and rules."x<J 
Building on the work of Hale, David Hume deemed it crucial to 
have a publicly salient legal "rule or regularity" that allows parties 
to "read the same message in the common situation" in order to 
plan, coordinate, and cooperate.<Jo Whether it engages in 
Adjudicating or Rulemaking, a constitutional court operating in 
the common law tradition must be mindful of its obligation to 
offer practical guidance. That obligation frames our analysis in the 
sections that follow. 
A. lMPLlCATIONS OF ADJUDICATING 
An Adjudicating Court offers guidance "through the careful 
interstitial working out of shared understandings of common laws 
and practices."(n The Adjudicating mode reflects the belief that 
fashioning incrementaL narrow decisions is preferable to 
"creating a new rule which itself needs interpretation" before it 
can offer effective guidance.92 From the Adjudicating Court's 
perspective, any aspiration for greater generahty in judicial 
utterances is misguided, for the "ordering of civil societies ... 
when it comes to particulars" requires practilcal judgment 
sensitive to the complexity of life.l)3 The Adjudicating Court will 
'8.7. Strauss. supra note 16, at lJOK. 
XX. /d. 
'8.9. Sir Matthew Hale, Reflections hy the Lord Chief'e Justice Hale on Mr. 1/ohhes 
His Dialogue of the /,awe, in SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
503 (3d cu. 1945). 
90. Gerald Postema, Some Roots in Our Notion of Precedent, in Prccctlcnt in Law 
2lJ (Laurence Goldstein cu., llJH7) (drawing on DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1751); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF 
HUMAN NATURE (173'8.)). 
()J. /d.at26. 
92. /d. 
lJ3. See Hale, supra note '8.9, at 502; Postema, supra note 90, at 19-20. 
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therefore be more interested in the fine-grained parsing and 
distinguishing of previous decisions and the narrow resolution of 
disputes based on the particular facts at issue. While the 
Rulemaking Court strives to articulate a sound rule to govern 
subsequent disputes, the Adjudicating Court applies specific law 
to specific fact, leaving future cases to future courts. The guidance 
of the Adjudicating Court is not an instruction manual, but rather 
a melody whose next bars the listener can anticipate and continue 
with confidence.Y4 
Because the Adjudicating Court dispenses with the need for 
articulating a sweeping rule, the costs of error in any given case 
will tend to be lower. The Court's narrow focus will yield stripped-
down majority opinions-opinions that are fact-intensive but 
relatively terse in developing the implications of the Court's 
decision for future disputes. In turn, restrained majority opinions 
will reduce the need for clarificatory concurrences, elaborate 
dissents, and the consequent rounds of responsive editing that 
separate writings engender. 
These features give the Adjudicating Court the ability to 
resolve more cases than the Rulemaking Court. And the 
Adjudicating Court should resolve more cases if it is to keep faith 
with the common law tradition. The nature of the Adjudicating 
Court is to teach by example rather than edict; the key is what the 
Court does rather than what it says. But for this approach to be 
effective in bringing clarity and certainty to the law, exemplars 
must emerge with regularity. The Adjudicating Court's 
particularity creates a concomitant demand for frequency. The 
more bars the Court hums, the better its audience will be at 
picking up the tune. 
Because guidance is a function of the number of decisions 
issued and the breadth of each decision, the Adjudicating Court 
must compensate for its narrowness on the latter score by 
maintaining a sizable docket. This requirement has implications 
for the criteria upon which certiorari is granted. For an 
Adjudicating Court, a request for error correction in the absence 
Y4. It is fitting that some of today's most prominent defenders of classical theories 
of the common law draw connections hetween law and melody. See Allan Beever, 
Formalism in Music and Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 213 (2011 ); Gerald J. PostL:ma, Melody 
and Law's Mindfitlness of Time, 17 RATIO JURIS 203 (2004). CJ RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW'S EMPIRE (1YX6) (analogizing law to a chain novel authored hy successive 
interpreters). 
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of a circuit split should not doom a petition for review, particularly 
if the case is of some practical importance. Likewise, 
constitutional uncertainties should not linger in the lower courts 
for the sake of letting them "percolate."95 Even a shallow split 
among the lower courts may highlight an area of genuine 
confusion or a challenging legal question worth resolving. Of 
course, there are limits on the number of interventions an 
Adjudicating Court can undertake. If every zone of constitutional 
law received the attention the Court has recently devoted to areas 
such as the Confrontation Clause and the jury trial right, the 
constitutional docket might swell to the point of unmanageability 
regardless of whether the Court opted to issue concise, narrow-
gauge opinions. That is to say nothing of the nonconstitutional 
docket: The Supreme Court has ultimate responsibility for 
resolving federal statutory questions and stands atop a vast 
administrative state that guarantees a steady stream of litigants 
seeking review. Given the scope and complexity of modern 
government, an Adjudicating Court has considerable challenges 
in front of it. 
Yet those challenges are not insurmountable. A Supreme 
Court that decided twenty, thirty, or forty additional cases per 
year would have substantially more opportunities to engage with 
constitutional doctrine on a granular level.% And continuing that 
practice year after year could generate momentum in multiple 
areas of jurisprudence, giving lower courts and other stakeholders 
a better idea of the trajectory of the law. This is not to suggest that 
the Court could grapple with the entire universe of constitutional 
doctrine during a single Term.97 The Court could, however, select 
more pockets of the law to develop through regular applications 
over a course of several years, thus increasing the number of 
domains in which it operates in Adjudicating mode. 
95. Ct: Carrington & Cramton, supra not<.: 30, at 622 ("ITihe Suprcm<.: Court has in 
recent decades left many, many 4u<.:stions unresolved despite conflicts in circuit court 
opinions."). 
96. An expansion of the Court's docket need not occur solely through the 
discretionary certiorari proc<.:ss. For example, Amanda Tyler has suggested a 
reinvigoration of the certification process to enhance the uniformity of federal law. See 
Amanda L. Tyler, SettinK the Supreme Court's Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification"!, 
7X GEO. WASH. L. RFV. 1310, 1327-2X (2010). Cf Carrington & Cramton, supra note 30, 
at 630-36 (proposing a panel of federal judges with authority to grant certiorari for the 
Supreme Court). 
97. See Hart, supra note 1, at l)() ("IWihat matters ahout Supreme Court opinions is 
not their 4uantity, hut their 4uality."). 
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B. IMPLICATIONS OF RULEMAKING 
Rulemaking can be an effective means of providing guidance 
to lower courts and other stakeholders when a superior court 
explains its decisions in rich and comprehensive terms.\)11 Even 
when broad rules are hazy around the edges, they can resolve 
numerous questions about the state of the law and the universe of 
plausible arguments. The effect is to enhance the clarity with 
which the law is understood and the firmness with which the law 
is established. The resulting certainty and publicity help to ensure 
that citizens can comprehend and react to background legal 
rules.l)l) 
Broad rulings can also promote uniformity among the lower 
courts. 100 To the extent a system places value upon the consistent 
treatment of similarly situated individuals, the reduction of 
disuniformity is another benefit of the Rulemaking approach. 101 
Even if it intervenes regularly over the years, the Adjudicating 
Court must accept that disuniformity and uncertainty will persist 
for some period of time as the law is gradually worked out. It 
tolerates that cost in light of countervailing virtues of deciding 
cases in the context of specific, discrete disputes. 102 The 
9X. See Schauer, supra note 59, at 206 ("]W]hile the ]Supreme] Court is issuing 
significantly fewer opinions, the lower courts arc hcing calico upon to ucciuc suhstantially 
more cases. Consequently, anu in light of these changes, we might suppose that the 
Supreme Court woulu now he increasingly attuncu to providing guidance to the lower 
courts ahout what the law is."). 
99. See Paul Yowell, l~e~islation, Common Law, and the Virtue of Clarity, in 
RICHARD EKINS, MODERN CHALLENGES TO THE RULE Of< LAW 121 (2011) ("Clarity is 
central anu strategic hccausc it hoth presupposes anu gives vital sense to the ucsiucrata of 
promulgation, prospectivity, generality, anu stahility."); LON L. FULLER, THI MORALITY 
OF LAW 46-51, 63-65 (1969) (identifying clarity, puhlicity, anu generality among the 
ucsiucrata of the rule of law). 
100. Rules that arc too hroau, of course, can themselves sow uncertainty. See Yowell, 
supra note 99, at 101 ("Clarity ... is a kino of Aristotelian mean hctwccn ovcrhrcauth anu 
ovcrspccificity."); Carrington & Cramton, supra note 30, at 623 (criticizing the Court's 
tendency ''to write ever longer opinions invoking ever hroaucr propositions of law that 
others may or may not rcau to resolve diverse future cases"). 
101. See, e.~., Evan H. Caminkcr, Why Must Inferior Courts Ohey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. X17, XS2 (19Y4) ("National uniformity offcucrallaw ensures 
that courts treat similarly situated litigants equally-a result often consiucreu a hallmark 
of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law."); cf Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme 
Court and Its Shrinkin~ Docket: The Ghost of William 1/oward Taft, YO MINN. L. REV. 
1363, 1366 (2006) (arguing that "the facts show heyonu the slightest uouht that the Court 
is willing to allow conflicts in fcucral Jaw to cxist-anu even worse, to persist"); hut see 
Amanua Frost, Overvaluin~ Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (200X). 
102. See Tyler, supra note 96, at 1316-17 (arguing that '']i]t shoulu he more than a 
little trouhling that the myriau questions left in the wake of the Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
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Rulemaking Court, by contrast, seeks to reduce uncertainty in 
one fell swoop notwithstanding the risks that inhere in 
formulating wide-ranging rules for scenarios not presently before 
it. 
The Rulemaking Court's aspiration is to maintain uniformity 
while pursuing a systematic and coherent body of law. Preference 
for Rulemaking may also imply rejection of the Adjudicating 
Court's premise that, over time, a series of narrow and fact-
specific interventions will yield a coherent pattern. For one who 
is skeptical of the promise of such coherence-perhaps because it 
depends on an assumption of steady progression that faces 
challenge from fractured courts whose membership changes over 
time- the Rule making mode is the safer path to clarity and 
consistency. 103 
But along with the advantages of Rulemaking come risks. 
Due to the significant costs that can arise fronn giving wide 
application to a constitutional rule that turns out to be unsound 
or unworkable, a Rulemaking Court should seek as much 
information and engage in as much deliberation as practicable. Its 
tendency should be to allow extensive consideration by the lower 
courts before acting, and to consult an array of specialist amicus 
briefs in route to understanding the full scope of i1nplications its 
rulings are likely to have. The Rulemaking Court must also ensure 
that it selects representative cases that pose the relevant issues as 
cleanly and fully as possible, so as to increase the chances that its 
pronouncements will be properly understood by lower courts and 
other stakeholders. It does little good, and may do considerable 
harm, for a Rulemaking Court to spend its time on cases that do 
not present generalizable and oft-litigated issues. 104 Likewise, the 
Blakt'ly v. Washint:ton. and United States v. Booker decisions effectively have resulted in 
disparate sentencing schemes around the country, notwithstanding that the relevant 
criminal punishment is being meted out by the same sovereign") (footnotes omitted). 
103. See Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Le~-:at Theory, in LEGAL THEORY 
AND COMMON LAW~. 23 (William Twining ed., 1(}~6) (arguing that when "cohesion has 
begun to bn:ak down lin a common law system! and a failure to achieve consensus becomes 
a commoner phenomenon, interest will devdop ... in the formulation of rules as to the 
use of authorities-that is to say warrants or proofs that this or that is the law"). 
104. See Schauer. supra note 5Y, at 222 (arguing with respect to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Morse v. Frederick, 551 lJ .S. 3Y3 (2007), that "in reality the question the Court 
answered was one virtually unique to the case before it. And by answering that unique 
question, and studiously answering no other, the Court said virtually nothing relevant to 
the large number of school speech cases that actually occupy the lower courts .... "); id. at 
226 ("Thus, on a topic on which there is a considerable amount of disputation and 
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Rulemaking Court should resist tarrying on error correction. 
Instead, it should use divisions among the lower courts as proxies 
for important, well-considered questions requiring focused 
resolution. 105 And, in recogition of the high stakes of broad rules 
and the substantial resources required to craft them, the 
Rulemaking Court should explain itself with great care and in 
great depth. 
It follows that a Rulemaking Court should have a relatively 
small docket. 106 Concerns about a court's competence to engage 
in rulemaking are significantly reduced when the court has 
adequate resources to devote to each case. Developing a rule is 
less fraught when time pressures are minimized and capacity for 
research and reflection is ample. This is particularly true for 
courts that enjoy a robust infrastructure for decisionmaking. The 
U.S. Supreme Court (when operating at full strength) consists of 
nine Justices who are assisted by the opinions of lower courts, the 
submissions of counsel and amici, and the support of some three 
dozen law clerks along with research librarians and additional 
staff. Professor Hart was right to worry that a Supreme Court that 
issued 115 or 120 opinions in a Term might be "trying to decide 
more cases than it can decide well," provided that we equate good 
decisionmaking with the articulation of broad rules. 107 But the 
calculus is much different for a Supreme Court that decides only 
75 cases per year. The combination of substantial resources and a 
slim docket gives the Justices a suitable framework for 
articulating wide-ranging rules without being concerned that 
cases are receiving inadequate attention. The Court may still 
make some unsound judgments, but its miscues will not be for lack 
of resources. 
litigation, it appl:ars that thl: Court took thl: wrong casl:, or at least a highly 
unrcprl:scntativc onl:, and, having done so, proceeded to decidl: that casl: as narrowly as 
possible."). 
105. q: William Baudl:, The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIRERTY 1, 3~ (2015) ("The ]Supreme] Court does not rl:Vl:rsc l:Vl:ry error, or even every 
clear error, that coml:s through the door."). 
106. q: Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 45~-59 (1959) (Frankfurtl:r, J., 
dissenting) ("Without adequate study there cannot be adequate reflection; without 
adequate rdkction there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate discussion 
there cannot be that fruitful inkrchangc of minds which is imlispl:nsahk to thoughtful, 
unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions. It is therefore 
impl:rativl: that the docket of the Court be kept down so that its volume docs not preclude 
wise adjudication."). 
107. Hart, supra note 1, at I 00. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that the adoption of a Rulemaking 
posture at the Supreme Court does not imply a similar mindset 
among the lower courts. It is possible, and perhaps sensible, for 
the Supreme Court to act as a Rulemaker even while the lower 
courts operate in Adjudicating mode. Pursuant to this division of 
responsibilities, the Supreme Court's constitutional interventions 
would be limited in number but rich enough to furnish analytical 
principles and doctrinal factors to guide the resolution of future 
cases. At the same time, the lower courts- operating individually 
and in conversation with each other-would develop the law 
through the repeated application of overarching, principles to 
specific facts. The lower courts would fill in the details of the 
Supreme Court's doctrinal sketches, allowing the judicial 
department to leverage the benefits of Rulemaking and 
Adjudicating alike. The more general point is that institutions at 
different levels of the judicial hierarchy may adopt different 
decisionmaking modes in their shared effort to build out the 
meaning of constitutional law. 
C. A NOTE ON TEXT AND STRUCTURE 
Before closing this Part, we hasten to add that the text and 
structure of the Constitution have potential implications for a 
court's decisionmaking mode. Some commentators contend that 
Article III's case-or-controversy requirement detnands a case-
specific, incremental approach that forecloses attempts at broad 
rulemaking. 10x Others argue that the hierarchical structure of the 
federal judiciary creates a need for uniformity, 109 which is best 
achieved through the issuance of broad rulings by the Supreme 
lOX. See, e.g, Pierre N. Leva!, .ludRinR Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, XI 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 124Y, 125t) (2006) ("The constitutional function of the courts is to 
adjudicate- to decide cases. The Constitution docs not explicitly grant to courts the power 
to make law."); id. at 1260 ("Courts make law only as a consequence of the performance 
of their constitutional duty to decide cases. They have no constitutional authority to 
establish the law otherwise.''); c( United Stales v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 26lJlJ (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our authority hegins and ends with the need to adjudge the rights 
of an injured party who stands before us seeking redress."). 
109. See, eK, .lAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COLRT 3X-39 (2009) 
("[Cjonsiderations of uniformity and convenience brooked large in the Framers' thinking 
about the structure of the federal judiciary (as James Wilson's pyramidal conception of the 
federal judiciary nicely confirms)."); id. at 41 (emphasizing the Supreme Court's 
"responsibility to administer a uniform body of law and resolve the differences among 
lower courts," a responsibility that is implied by "the Framers' very conception of a unitary 
and hierarchical, rather than a plural and horizontal, judiciary''). 
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Court. 110 Though these issues are exceedingly important, we have 
put them aside for present purposes. Our aim is simply to explore 
what a court's docket management and n1ode of decisionmaking 
reveal about the nature of its institutional role. 
III. AGAINST GUIDANCE 
Thus far we have explored two modes of common law 
decisionmaking in the constitutional domain. Rulemaking Courts 
frame their decisions in broad terms; Adjudicating Courts focus 
on the narrow application of law to specific facts. We have argued 
that the choice between these approaches carries implications for 
the way in which a court shapes constitutional discourse. An 
Adjudicating Court may present its individual decisions narrowly, 
but it must issue a relatively high number of those decisions in 
order to furnish adequate guidance to the legal community. As 
applied to the U.S. Supreme Court, it makes little difference 
whether such decisions are part of the Court's merits docket 
(which entails full briefing and argument) or whether they emerge 
in the form of summary reversals. 111 Either way, the Supreme 
Court must provide a sustained dialogue with the lower courts and 
other stakeholders. By comparison, a Rulemaking Court decides 
a smaller number of cases but compensates with wide-ranging 
opinions. Freed from the pressures of an onerous docket, the 
Rulemaking Court enjoys the capacity to treat every case as an 
occasion for extensive exposition. 
These divergent approaches to common law judging embody 
a shared commitment to the Supreme Court's role in furnishing 
guidance about the meaning of constitutional norms. In this Part, 
we examine two decisionmaking modes that reflect a different 
conception of the Supreme Court's role- a conception, we shall 
argue, that resides outside the common law paradigms. 
110. See, e.g, Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case f£JT Vertical Maximalism, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) ("II ]n our current judiciary, the Court can review only a 
fraction of the lower federal and state court cases raising federal questions. The Court must 
therefore make the most of the cases it docs hear hy issuing hroad (maximal) decisions 
that guide the lower courts in the many cases that it lacks the capacity to review."). 
111. See Baudc, supra note 105, at 31 (ohscrving that "I m ]any of the Court's summary 
reversals appear to he designed to ensure that lower courts follow Supreme Court 
precedents"). 
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A. RELUCTANCE 
A court may decide a small number of cases and frame its 
decisions narrowly. This is the approach of a Reluctant Court. 
The Reluctant mindset is evident in the Supreme Court's 
recent episodes of granting certiorari on, and then assiduously 
avoiding, significant constitutional questions. In Bond v. United 
States, for example, the Court had an opportunity to determine 
whether a ratified treaty can grant Congress lawmaking power not 
otherwise conferred via the Constitution's enumerated powers. 112 
Although three Justices were willing to say the implementing 
statute exceeded Congress's authority, a majority of the Court 
avoided the question by reading the statute narrowly. 1u Similarly, 
in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, the Court stepped into a dispute 
over the First Amendment rights of the broadcast media. 114 
Rather than addressing the (fully briefed) First Amendment 
question, the Court rested on the narrower ground that the FCC's 
failure to provide fair notice of the bounds of legality violated due 
process. 115 Situations like these illustrate the Court speaking 
sparsely as well as softly. Such is the predilection of the Reluctant 
Court. 11 fl 
Such reluctance, we submit, falls short of discharging the 
primary obligations of a constitutional court operating in the 
112. 114 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
111. See id. at 20XX-Y1 (refusing to infer congressional intent to alter the federal/state 
halance in responsihility for criminal law); id. at 20YX-2102 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(addressing the underlying constitutional question). 
114. 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012). 
115. !d. at 2320 ("]B]ecause the Court resolves these cases on fair notice grounds 
under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First Amendment implications of 
the Commission's indecency policy."). This cautious tendency also seems to have migrated 
to the Court's resolution of major questions of statutory interpretation. In Bond, for 
example, the majority sought to cahin the reach of its non-textualist approach to the 
relevant statute, explaining that "] t ]his case is unusual, and our analysis is appropriately 
limited" andjustified hy an "exceptional convergence of factors." Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 20Y3. 
See also Kiohd v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 165Y (2013) (stretching the 
canon against extraterritorial application of statutes to avoid resolving whether the Alien 
Tort Statute applies to corporations). 
116. Reluctance also marked the Court's decisionmaking in major cases during 
Octoher Term 2015. Consider the hirth-control-mandate cases, where the Court requested 
supplemental hricfing in route to vacating and remanding on narrow grounds. See Zuhik 
v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 2016 WL 2X4244Y (2016). Or consider the Court's similar 
decision to avoid a challenging standing question in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
2016 WL 2X42447 (2016). Even if these instances of reluctance owe ilo the ahsence of a 
ninth Justice who could settle 4-4 splits, they resemhle similar examples in recent years 
during which the Court was operating at full strength. 
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common law tradition. A court that speaks both rarely and 
guardedly fails to provide the requisite clarity and certainty 
regarding the content of constitutional norms. 117 Of course, it does 
not necessarily follow that Reluctance is unjustifiable. For 
starters, a Reluctant Jurist might believe that the Adjudicating 
mode is not as effective as its champions claim. One need not go 
so far as to accept Jeremy Bentham's argument that the common 
law is "dog law" 11 ~ in order to conclude that requiring people to 
predict the arc of precedent is a precarious method of securing 
rights and facilitating coordination and cooperation. 11 l) Not every 
lawyer, let alone every citizen, can intuit the direction of a 
common law that changes even as its rules are applied. 
Anxieties about the effectiveness of judicial guidance might 
also trace to the Supreme Court's nature as a multi-member 
tribunal. The issuance of practical guidance via frequent, 
incremental interventions is most effective when judges operate 
with a shared sense of reasonableness about the content and 
contours of constitutional doctrine-in other words, when there 
is a "convergence of judgment on common solutions." 120 As we 
noted in Part I, the Adjudicating model depends on the 
assumption that a line of narrow decisions eventually will produce 
a coherent legal rule. That prospect may be put in jeopardy by a 
sharply divided court whose changing composition often 
generates sharp deviations in litigated outcomes. Rather than 
117. q: Schauer, supra note 59, at 227 (arguing that "[ijn n..:ccnt years the Court has 
appeared especially unconcerned with the guidance aspect of its work, and has perhaps 
taken to heart a hit too much the importunings of those who would have it act minimally 
and decide merely ·one case at a time"'). 
111-1. Jeremy Bentham, Truth Versus Ashhurst, in 5 TilE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 215 (John Bowring cd., 1 X41) ("When your dog docs anything you want to 
hrcak him of, you wait till he docs it, and then heat him for it. This is the way you make 
laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you and me.''). Bentham's 
analogy is ghastly, hut it underscores his disdain of the retroactivity he saw in the common 
law. (Incidentally, as pet owners, we would suggest that the positive reinforcement of good 
hehaviors makes for a far more humane and effective jurisprudence of dog law.) 
119. C(: RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 125 (2012) 
('"Puhlic promulgation and canonical formulation [in legislation[ make the legal change 
easier to locale and grasp than that found in unwritten custom or in the hest understanding 
of a line of cases."); Yowell, supra note 99, at121 (arguing that '"clarity is hest achieved hy 
making law through legislation" in "codes and statute hooks" and that the common law is 
an "inferior mode of lawmaking that deviates from rule of law values in important 
respects''). 
120. Postema, supra note 10, at 10; see also Simpson, supra note 101, at 21-22 
(emphasizing the importance of normative cohesion and consensus in the classical 
common law tradition). 
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facilitating the gradual crystallization of legal principles, a series 
of interventions by a vacillating or sharply divided Supreme Court 
may lead to cloudiness and confusion. 121 
But the wide-ranging, forward-looking, and canonical 
statements that characterize the Rulemaking Court create their 
own concerns. Perhaps the cases that come before the Court, even 
if they have been carefully vetted, provide an unrepresentative 
view of the relevant field. The equities of particular cases might 
also skew efforts at broad rulemaking in ways that subsequent 
revisions cannot cure. 122 Furthermore, one might conclude that 
the Supreme Court's mandate to act only in reaction to 
particularized cases and controversies limits its effectiveness in 
controlling its rulemaking agenda. And there is the additional 
worry that, as compared to legislators or expert administrative 
agencies, generalist judges simply lack the competence to craft 
broad decisions, no matter how many law clerks, amicus briefs, 
and spare hours they have. 123 In the most extreme case, a Supreme 
Court Justice who harbors these concerns might favor retracing 
the steps of Bentham, who began by seeking to improve the 
common law through the use of forwarding-looking rules only to 
abandon that project in favor of a comprehensive code that 
minimizes judicial discretion. 124 
121. This phenomenon can he seen in vexing areas of jurisprudence such as the 
application of the Estahlishmcnt Clause. See Steven G. Gcy, Vestiges of the Estahlishmcnt 
Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) ("One of the few things constitutional scholars 
of every stripe seem to agree ahout is the proposition that the Court's Estahlishmcnt 
Clause jurisprudence is an incoherent mess."). 
122. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U.Ctll. L. REV. XX3 (200A). 
See also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Umits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (197X) 
(identifying the limits of adjudication in resolving complex, polycentric social prohlems). 
123. See, e.g, McCicsky v. Kcmp,4Xl U.S. 279,319 (19X7) (explaining, in considering 
the constitutionality of capital punishment, that legislatures ''arc hcttcr qualified to weigh 
and evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with 
a lkxibility of approach that is not available to the courts") (quotation omitted); ADRIAN 
YERMEULE, JUDGIN<i UNDER UNCERTAINTY 242-43 (200()) (douhting the Court's 
"competence to evaluate moral arguments !presented in materials like the "Philosopher's 
Brief'' on a constitutional right to assisted suicide! and also to ask about facts and 
incentives" relevant to policy choices); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional 
Choice, 102 Nw. lJ. L. REV. 727, 755-5X (200X) (arguing that as compared to agencies' 
ability to undertake "wide-ranging investigations," a lay judge's understanding will "be 
fragmentary and quite likely outdated"); c{. Cass R. Sunstcin, Is Tohacco a DruR? 
Administrative ARencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (199X) 
("IAigcncics have hccomc modern America's common law courts, and properly so."). 
124. See GERALD .I. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND TilE COMMON LAW TRADITION 191-
217 (ll)X()) (tracing this evolution of Bentham's thought). 
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Given the drawbacks of both Adjudicating and Rulemaking, 
the argu1nent goes, the Supreme Court should free itself of the 
idea that its interventions are invariably positive from the 
standpoint of legal guidance. Instead, it should adopt a posture of 
reluctance: It should inject itself into constitutional debates only 
on rare occasions, and it should say as little as possible even then. 
Put differently, the Reluctant Jurist concludes that the common 
law ideal, whatever its merits in other times and contexts, should 
not be the animating vision of constitutional law in our large, 
complex polity. 
This position, though, is unpersuasive. Even a Reluctant 
Court will need to explain its reasons for its comparatively rare 
interventions, if only to ensure that parties avoid hitting a 
particular constitutional tripwire again and again. Unless the 
Court is to reject judicial review entirely or limit itself to summary 
affirmations and reversals without opinion, the creation of 
constitutional doctrine Is inevitable. A Reluctant Court 
accordingly must consider how best to offer authoritative 
guidance through what small dollops of doctrine it develops. In 
doing so, it has little choice but to try to overcome the challenges 
that led it to doubt the common law ideal in the first place. 
The challenges of developing clear constitutional doctrine 
are not the only possible explanations for judicial reluctance. 
Perhaps a court is reluctant because it believes that, within a 
democracy, much of the content of constitutional law should be 
developed through mechanisms outside the judiciary. 125 For 
example, Keith Whittington has argued that matters of 
constitutional construction- by which he means judgments made 
"in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning"- are the 
provinces of democratic politics. 126 He argues that "where the text 
is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful 
but exhaustive reduction to legal rules," 127 any "efforts by the 
courts to fill remaining gaps in the law represent political 
choices." 12~ While the courts may legitimately engage in 
125. q: Schauer, supra note 23, at 45X ("A judge who makes law is simultaneously 
deciding not to defer to some other lawmaking institution."). 
126. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 5 (2001); see also 
James B. Thayer, The Ori~in and Scope of the American Doctrine ofConstitUiionaf Law, 7 
HARY. L. REV. 129 (1X93). 
127. WHriTINGTON, supra note 126, at 5. 
12X. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation 157 (1<-N9). 
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construction by "provisionally maintatmng constitutional 
understandings widely shared by other political actors," they may 
not go any further. Acting as "innovators on behalf of 
constitutional understandings that are not widely shared by other 
political actors" would strain the legitimacy of their behavior. 129 
Building from this type of analysis, one might defend the 
Reluctant Court as properly cognizant of the limits of its authority 
to resolve political debates without the anchor of determinate 
positive law (such as constitutional text) or widely shared 
constitutional understandings. On this account, the Reluctant 
Court is principally concerned with issues other than the judicial 
development of constitutional rules and principles. 
Yet that depiction is difficult to square with the modern 
Supreme Court's insistence on preserving and exercising its 
Marbury-given right to announce the content of the law. It is 
conceivable that the Court might someday move systematically in 
the direction of political deference to avoid trespassing into 
constitutional spaces that belong to the people and their politics. 
At present, such deference is sporadic at best. If the Court wishes 
to establish for itself a principled reluctance, it has the burden of 
explaining the reasons behind that approach, the attendant 
conceptualization of the judiciary's role in constitutional 
discourse, and the manner in which it will bring its judgment to 
bear consistently across cases. 
B. EXPERIMENTING 
Standing in opposition to the Reluctant Court is the 
Experimental Court. Like the Adjudicating Court, the 
Experimental Court seeks to resolve many cases. But in crafting 
its opinions, the Experimental Court pursues the broad guidance 
and deep reasoning associated with the Rulemaking mode of 
decisionmaking. 
The Experimental Court brings our project full-circle to the 
concerns expressed by Professor Hart. Deep and broad 
rulemaking in case after case would test the Supreme Court's 
institutional capacity. The likely result would be the proliferation 
of unsound and short-sighted decisions. The Experimental Court 
might respond by using its large docket for frequent course 
129. Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 119, 129 (2010). 
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corrections over time. But the inevitable switchbacks, blind alleys, 
dead-ends, and U -turns on the road to equilibrium would levy a 
heavy toll on the legal system. In the worst-case scenario, the 
Experimental Court might even become a Flailing Court, driving 
the polity down roads to nowhere, or at least nowhere worthwhile. 
That type of Court is most vulnerable to the kind of criticism that 
Professor Hart levied: sacrificing quality to quantity and 
deliberation to haste. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has considered the relationship between the 
Supreme Court's management of its docket, its mode of 
decisionmaking, and its institutional role. Along the way, we have 
drawn distinctions between the nature of a Rulemaking Court, an 
Adjudicating Court, a Reluctant Court, and an Experimental 
Court. In reality, of course, the modern Supreme Court is all these 
things, and more. Sometimes it acts as an eager Rulemaker, 
reaching out to settle an area of law and to direct the law's path 
forward. At other times it is an Adjudicator, becoming interested 
in a particular issue and developing it-narrowly, methodically, 
incrementally- over the course of years. In still other contexts, 
the Court is Reluctant, limiting its own role even when 
constitutional disputes are squarely presented for resolution. 
Finally, the Court n1ay be Experin1ental, aggressively expanding 
its docket and sweeping broadly as it goes. These competing 
approaches are all the more salient because debates over the 
Court's institutional role often arise within the context of hot-
button controversies. Depending on one's perspective, the same 
case n1ight implicate the judicial '"province and duty" to ''say what 
the law is" or the constitutional imperative for judges to limit 
themselves to the ''particular cases" in front of them-with both 
precepts tracing their lineage to no lesser authority than 
Marbury. 130 
An eclectic or undulating vision of the Supreme Court's role 
is not necessarily untenable. But there must be some reason why 
the Court is willing to intervene repeatedly in certain areas- thus 
opening up the possibility of operating as an Adjudicating 
130. Compare U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 26XX (2013) (invoking .. say what the 
law is" language), with id. at 2703 (Scalia, .1., dissenting) (invoking "particular case" 
language). 
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Court- even as it engages with other issues in sporadic fashion. 131 
Is the Court more comfortable with the Adjudicating or 
Rulemaking mode? Does its choice owe to considerations of 
constitutional structure, political philosophy, pragmatic calculus, 
or otherwise? 132 Alternatively, is ours an era in which the Court's 
self-imposed mandate is not to lead, but to follow? If so, is the 
Court's rationale for this understanding related to institutional 
competence, or capacity, or a resetting of the constitutional 
separation of powers? Is it simply a tactical ceasefire between 
Justices who cannot agree on a methodology of constitutional 
interpretation? u 3 And in all events, what vision of the Court's 
institutional role do the Justices employ to guide their actions 
(and inactions)? Only upon answering these questions can we 
determine what kind of court we have. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's discretionary docket isn't so 
discretionary after all. To be sure, the Court remains in charge of 
choosing its own cases. But its approach to case selection creates 
obligations for its crafting of opinions. We sometirnes talk of the 
Court's certiorari decisions as distinct from its "Inerits docket." 
That distinction should not obscure the relationship between case 
selection and opinion writing. It is the interplay between docket 
management and decision making style that defines the role of the 
Court. 
131. q: Carrington & Cramton, supra notl: 30, at 606 (arguing that the Court's 
certiorari practice is unprincipled and lacks transparency). 
132. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Common Law Court or Council of Revision'!, 101 
YALE L.J. 94(), ()50-51 (I ()()2) (distinguishing a depiction of the Supreme Court as a 
''paradigmatic common law adjudicator" from a depiction of the Court as a "Council of 
Revision" empowered to "vetoi]Icgislation on grounds of morality or prudence, not just 
irreconcilability with constitutional commands"). 
133. See Owens & Simon, supra note 7, at 1224. 
